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ThE VaLuES of BiodiVERSiTy. an inTRoduCTion
1. Inventories of Life
The idea of biological diversity has somehow existed in the human mind since 
the very beginning of the existence of our species. according to some researchers1, 
human minds would have evolved so as to be receptive to nature’s diversity: in 
order to survive, primitive human beings had to harness such diversity through 
grouping things, distinguishing edible from non-edible fruits, dangerous from 
harmless animals, toxic from non-toxic plants, etc. These very classes, namely 
edible vs. non-edible, toxic vs. non-toxic, have also shaped the first scientific 
taxonomies. These were actually pharmacopoeias, one of the earliest is the Shen-
nung pen ts’ao ching (Divine Husbandman’s Materia Medica) attributed to the 
legendary father of Chinese medicine, the Emperor Shen nung who, according 
to the legend, personally tasted the herbs to test the medicinal value of the 365 
medicines included in his inventory. 
Similarity and diversity of morphology, genetic makeup, ecological functions, 
and reproduction means are at the very core of modern biological taxonomies. 
The first step in building a biological classification is to collect samples of a cer-
tain kind, as the following anecdote from darwin’s autobiography2 exemplifies:
But no pursuit at Cambridge was followed with nearly so much eagerness or gave 
me so much pleasure as collecting beetles. it was the mere passion for collecting, for 
i did not dissect them and rarely compared their external characters with published 
descriptions, but got them named anyhow. i will give a proof of my zeal: one day, on 
tearing off some old bark, i saw two rare beetles and seized one in each hand; then i 
1 See oksanen 2004: 1 ff.
2 darwin 1958: 62.
4saw a third and new kind, which i could not bear to lose, so that i popped the one 
which i held in my right hand into my mouth. alas it ejected some intensely acrid 
fluid, which burnt my tongue so that i was forced to spit the beetle out, which was 
lost, as well as the third one.
after this first step, a taxonomist must of course go further, and check 
whether those observable differences are in some way connected to evolutionary 
processes or, said differently, whether a supposed morphospecies corresponds to 
a genuine evolutionary species. in several cases – for instance when intra- and 
interspecific phenotypic variability are overlapping3; or when morphological 
traits are too few, as for bacteria – molecular biological technologies are used, 
such as dna barcoding. 
Considering biodiversity specifically, it is a rather uncontroversial stance that 
“biodiversity both as a vernacular and a scientific concept is about the classifica-
tion of perceptible things and phenomena, especially species”4. The idea lying 
beyond the introduction of the term “biodiversity” (which occurred in 1986 
during the national forum on Biodiversity which took place in Washington 
dC, as can be read in several of the papers that form the present volume) was 
indeed to handle the decline of the biodiversity itself, understood as species 
richness. Today, in order to practically proceed with the achievement of that 
goal, the first step is to describe, evaluate, and assess the biodiversity of a cer-
tain area at a given time. To do so, what is needed in the first place is, at large, 
the counting of the elements of the system and the assessment of the degree 
of differentiation among them. in other words, when we know what to count 
and how to compare what we are counting, we are making our way towards 
an understanding of what must be saved (and, at least partially, of what biodi-
versity is). To do that means to make taxonomies, namely scientifically based 
inventories of natural objects.
Clearly, making taxonomies is all but an easy task, as it is shown – making 
reference especially to deep-sea fauna inventories – in the contribution “ideal 
and actual inventories of Biodiversity” by anouk Barberousse and Sophie 
Bary. in pre-evolutionary approaches, making classifications was somewhat 
easier, since the classified things were considered to be static and members of 
discrete groups. This is because species were thought of as the atoms of the 
creation, by virtue of their having essences coming directly from God. accord-
ingly, all species were already existent and no new species could ever appear 
(otherwise it would have meant that something was missing in the universe, 
hence that creation, and God himself as creator, were not perfect). Somehow, 
3 as for some venerids, the most speciose family of heterodont bivalve mollusks, see Chen 
et al. 2009. 
4 oksanen 2004: 2.
5pre-evolutionary premises would make it easier to satisfy the major requirements 
of ideal inventories: systematicity and exhaustivity. But the theoretical frame-
work pre-evolutionary taxonomies were grounded in missed the most important 
point: life evolves. it continuously produces, and loses, diversity. By means of 
divergence processes (caused by differing types of factors, from geographic isola-
tion to hybridization), new species originate, some of them become extinct and 
others transform themselves, becoming different species, with different genetic 
makeups, morphologies and ecological functions. 
although traditional essentialism and creationism are dead issues in biology, 
Linnaeus’s system – stated in his Systema naturae, whose first edition (1735) goes 
back to pre-evolutionary times – is still in use, in spite of its static conception of 
the diversity of life. indeed, it is the system referred to by contemporary inter-
national codes that regulate zoological and botanical nomenclature. This may be 
seen as an inconsistency. according to Barberousse and Bary, on the contrary, the 
persistence of fixist, creationist, and essentialist assumptions in taxonomies, does 
not imply that the Linnean tools for nomenclature should be rejected, because 
they are useful tools that help taxonomists to carry on their work. a work which 
is made difficult by a series of practical constraints and cognitive biases. Some 
times, for instance, it happens that the more specimens to be classified that are 
at hand, the more differences are spotted and then more species are postulated. 
Some other times, just the opposite happens, as in the case of species or higher 
taxa showing a strong sexual dimorphism, or in polymorphic species. a striking 
example is the case5 reported by Johnson and his colleagues in 2009 concerning 
some fishes living in the oceanic bathypelagic realm (1000-4000 m). They were 
assigned to three different families: Cetomimidae (whalefishes), described in 
1895, Mirapinnidae (tapetails), described in 1956, and the Megalomycteridae 
(bignose fishes), described in 1966. Based on morphology and mitogenomic 
sequence data, Johnson and colleagues did show that these fishes, rather than 
being separate families, are larvae, males and females, respectively, of a single 
family Cetomimidae! Misidentification was caused by the fact that this fishes 
have larvae living in upper, and richer, water (200 m), and by the dramatic 
morphological transformations the larvae go through – changes in skeleton, 
particularly in the head – because of developing different feeding mechanisms. 
(deep-sea is a nutrient-poor habitat; accordingly, organisms develop strong 
morphological and behavioral specializations in order to survive.)
a different cognitive bias are different lumper/splitter tendencies, resulting 
from different researchers having different subjective tendencies to split organ-
isms into more or less species taxa6. Conflicting theoretical frameworks, practical 
difficulties, and cognitive biases become even more evident when taxonomic 
5 i am grateful to Sandro Minelli for having brought this case to my attention.
6 hey 2001; Richards 2010.
6work meets biodiversity discourse. in this case, making taxonomies implies 
dealing not only with epistemic and practical constraints, theoretical and cog-
nitive biases, but also with political and economic interferences and interests, 
as Barberousse and Bary explain.
as mentioned, diversity is the product of evolution: life evolves producing novel 
diversity and species become extinct as a consequence of natural or anthropogenic 
processes. Biodiversity, as alessandro Minelli writes in his contribution, is 
the product of change. nonetheless, “biodiversity exists also because there are 
rules against an uncontrolled mixing of individuals or species”. our species, 
in a diversity of actions “ranging from the ancient agricultural practices such 
as livestock hybridization and the use of grafts to the modern applications of 
genetic engineering and transplantation techniques”, breached so-called natural 
boundaries, both those between one individual and another, and between species 
and species. a burning issue is, of course, that of GMos – to which has been 
devoted the Cartagena Protocol, an international agreement on biosafety adopted 
in 2000. do GMos follow under the extension of the concept “biodiversity”? or 
rather, are they to be considered a threat to biodiversity because of their impact 
on the environment? The impact of GM crops, in particular, is of concern for 
the diversity of crop landraces. it is estimated that approximately 7,000 plant 
species have been used for human consumption; but just four crops – wheat, 
maize, rice and potato – account for one-half of the total world food produc-
tion. The worry is that the introduction of GM crops will decrease the genetic 
diversity of crops. Coping with this worry is the main aim of the Cartagena 
protocol, which sets conditions for cross-border movements of bioengineered 
seeds and transgenic plants and animals7. according to a less optimistic inter-
pretation, the real aim of the Cartagena protocol, as well as of the Convention 
on Biological diversity signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, should be read as a 
compromise. The compromise is between the north – rich in technologies – and 
the South – rich in biodiversity and then in genetic varieties on the sharing out 
of the rights on biodiversity, understood as an economical resource8. 
2. Three understanding of the value of biodiversity
Speaking of agricultural biodiversity, one of the main meanings of the term 
“value” becomes evident when connected to biodiversity, namely economic value. 
We care about biodiversity and we want to conserve it because our lives materi-
ally depend on it. in the so called ecosystem-services approach, biodiversity is 
mainly understood in terms of the services that ecosystems can offer to present 
7 See Lévêque and Mounolou 2003.
8 See, for instance, aubertin, Boisvert and Vivien 1998.
7and future human beings. Ecosystem services represent the benefits that human 
beings can derive from ecosystem functions, such as food production, water 
supply, climate regulation, soil formation, pollination, as well as recreational 
and cultural services. Such services can be monetized. it has been estimated 
that “for the entire biosphere, the value (most of which is outside the market) 
is estimated to be in the range of uS $ 16-54 trillion (1012) per year”9. in the 
remainder of this introduction, two further meanings of the value of biodiver-
sity will be explored – ethical and aesthetical value. Before that, however, let us 
discuss what biodiversity is (supposed to be).
2.1. What, if anything, is biodiversity?
Biological diversity means the variability among living organisms from all sources 
including inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystems10.
Biodiversity is “the variety of life”, and refers collectively to variation at all levels of 
biological organization11.
Biodiversity is not simply the number of genes, species, ecosystems, or any other 
group of things in a defined area […] More useful than a definition, perhaps, would 
be a characterization of biodiversity that identifies the major components at several 
levels of organization12.
Biodiversity is an attribute of an area and specifically refers to the variety within and 
among living organisms, assemblages of living organisms, biotic communities, and biotic 
processes, whether naturally occurring or modified by humans13.
These are just a few examples of how biodiversity has been defined. in his 
review of the relevant literature from 1976 to 1996, don C. deLong (1996) 
lists no fewer than 85 definitions of biodiversity. They differ primarily in their 
degree of inclusiveness: from those that include the present/past/future of all 
life on Earth to those that restrict biodiversity to the state of a specific area at 
a given time; from those that include processes to those that only countenance 
entities; from those that include human-induced biodiversity (such as alien spe-
9 Costanza et al. 1997.
10 CBd 1992.
11 Gaston and Spicer 1998: 3.
12 noss 1990.
13 deLong 1996.
8cies or genetically modified crops) to those that exclude it from the inventory, 
equating biodiversity with wilderness, and so on.
What are we to make of the fact that there are so many definitions of bio-
diversity, often inconsistent with one another; and some of them clearly not 
implementable in conservation policies? using a term with different meanings 
can be one of the major stumbling blocks to reaching an agreement in decision 
making. To establish effective shared conservation strategies, an agreement on 
the definition of biodiversity, even provisional and operative, would be desirable. 
This indeterminacy makes room for manipulation and misinformation since 
different interests and different motives are involved in biodiversity conservation. 
These differences have clear political and economical implications, as already 
mentioned, and a vague concept is easier to use in different contexts for differ-
ent purposes. on the other hand, this very same indeterminacy is one of the 
reasons why use of the concept of “biodiversity” has proven to be such a success. 
in 1995, Jacques Blondel wrote that the concept of biodiversity was just an 
empty shell, reaffirming in different words a judgment already given by Stuart 
h. hurlbert that, “species diversity [had] become a meaningless concept”14. The 
concept of species diversity, because of the semantic and technical problem that 
affected it, had become, according to hurlbert, a “nonconcept”, as it is written 
in the title of his article, and should have been abandoned. in a similar spirit, 
Christian Lévêque defined “biodiversity” as an “auberge espagnole”, a bag in 
which each of us puts its own personal representation of nature. it cannot then 
be surprising – Lévêque argued – that the term “biodiversity” has become so 
popular, since each of us can find what s/he previously put in it15! if biodiversity 
is nothing but a mental representation, shouldn’t the term be dismissed from 
scientific discourse? according to some, the answer is in the positive. in a recent 
article with the provocative title “Save the Planet: Eliminate Biodiversity”16, 
Carlos Santana argues precisely that biodiversity (it is not entirely clear whether 
he refers to the term, the concept, or the object) is an “unnecessary placeholder 
for biological value of all sorts, and that we are better off eliminating it from 
conservation biology”. is that the only way?
Contributions from Philippe huneman and Patrick Blandin, respectively, 
address the issue in a different way. huneman acknowledges that there is prob-
ably no plausible answer to the question “is there a real scientific necessity for 
‘biodiversity’?”, and that the term “biodiversity” is simply overdetermined. 
in other words, it is possible that the political genesis of the term somehow 




9“biodiversity” was part of an explicit political operation. This is clearly stated in 
the words of dan Janzen, invited by E.o. Wilson to speak at the 1986 forum: 
The Washington conference? That was an explicit politic event, explicitly designed 
to make Congress aware of this complexity of species that we’re loosing. and […] the 
word was punched into that system at that point deliberately. a lot of us went to that 
talk on a political mission. We were asked, will we come and do this thing? So we did.17
it is somehow ironic that the forum where this entire “biodiversity-phenom-
enon” started was sponsored by the national academy of Science, reputed for 
extreme conservatism, and according to which, “Science must be kept above 
the fray of politics and squabbles if its word is to carry the considerable weight 
of objectivity, truth, and value-neutrality”18. 
Be that as it may, if we focus instead on the question “What is biodiversity?”, 
the answer lies, for huneman, in the tension between biodiversity and biodi-
versities. That is, on the one hand, the characterization of biological diversity 
as defined by the 1992 Convention on Biological diversity – which gave rise 
to a large concept of “biodiversity” as somehow holistic and concerning the 
well-being of the Earth. on the other hand, the many specific concepts of di-
versity elaborated in scientific ecology or in other branches of biology, all of 
them fragmented but at the same time “calling scientists for integrations and 
disciplinary syntheses”. it is these different and conflicting characterizations that 
huneman’s paper focuses upon. 
Blandin chooses a more historical approach to tackle the very same ques-
tion: “is there a real scientific necessity for ‘biodiversity’?”. using the year 1988 
(the year of publication of Biodiversity, the Proceedings of the forum, edited 
by E.o. Wilson) as a dividing line between pre and post ecological works on 
biological diversity, Blandin’s contribution explores whether something, in post-
’88 researches, represents a genuinely novel scientific interrogative compared 
to pre-’88 researches.
2.2. Ethical and aesthetical value of biodiversity
When invented, “biodiversity” was intended as a slogan to draw the attention 
and support of decision makers, governments, scientists, and citizens to  the 
rapid decrease in the number of species. in particular, the intent was to raise 
political and academic awareness of species loss and decline caused by human 
activities. Some researchers claim that we are facing an unprecedented loss 
of species. Wilson19 hypothesized that the extinction rate could be between 




27,000 and 100,000 species per year and the Millenium Ecosystem assess-
ment suggests that the contemporary extinction rate could be 1,000 to 10,000 
times higher than rates recorded among fossil lineages. a brand new scientific 
discipline – Conservation Biology – was established in the u.S. at the end of 
the 1980s with the aim of conserving biodiversity. 
it is undeniable that we think that biodiversity has a value. We have already 
seen that biodiversity has a value because of the services that ecosystems provide 
to us. among them, we find not only material benefits but also recreational and 
cultural benefits, such as for instance “aesthetic, artistic, educational, spiritual, 
and/or scientific values”20. 
aristotle was probably the first, in the Western philosophical tradition, to 
reveal the double characterization, scientific and aesthetic, of the diversity of 
life. in the first book of On the Parts of Animals, he wrote:
Every realm of nature is marvellous: and as heraclitus, when the strangers who came 
to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to 
go in, reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in that kitchen 
divinities were present, so we should venture on the study of every kind of animal 
without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something natural and something 
beautiful. absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be 
found in nature’s works in the highest degree, and the resultant end of her generations 
and combinations is a form of the beautiful21.
Jorge Marques da Silva’s essay represents an attempt to shape, in a contem-
porary theoretical framework, this intuition. according to him, “a reconciliation 
between science and nature is possible by way of the role played by ecological 
and biological sciences on the aesthetical and ethical appraisal of natural di-
versity”. in fact, as Marques da Silva argues, even though science was founded 
to dominate nature, a different role can be assigned to it when environmental 
aesthetics and environmental ethics meet. Making reference, in particular, to 
allen Carlson’s philosophical aesthetics, the paper shows that the aesthetical 
appreciation of nature requires a scientific understanding of the ecological and 
biological processes, where biodiversity plays a central role. 
Sue Spaid’s paper turns to the relation between biodiversity and cultural engage-
ment, arguing that “human beings who value their own culture protect nature”. 
To defend this thesis, Spaid takes into account different elements, including 
the link between the variety of spoken language of an area and the biodiversity 
that characterizes it; the role of cities and remote communities safeguarding 
habitats; as well as the interaction between biodiversity and multiculturalism.
20 Costanza et al. 1997.
21 Transl. by W. ogle. Provided by The internet Classics archive. available online at: http://
classics.mit.edu//aristotle/parts_animals.html
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until here, we have spoken of values that are instrumental: biodiversity has 
value because it allows us (or other species) to reach some end that we (or other 
species) find desirable, be it a material, cultural, or an aesthetical benefit. a 
classic example of something possessing instrumental value is money; we usu-
ally look for money because of things that we want to buy with it, and not for 
money itself. But, of course, this is not the only possible value we can attribute 
to biodiversity. according to some authors, attributing a mere instrumental (and 
usually anthropocentric) value to biodiversity is not a fully satisfactory approach. 
on the one hand, they say, it is not exhaustive, since there are lots of endangered 
species that are unlikely to be a potential resource to humans or to other species. 
on the other hand, it doesn’t seem “fully moral”: “To value all other species 
only for human interests is like a nation’s arguing all its foreign policy in terms 
of national interest”, says holmes Rolston22. according to these authors, then, 
species – and biodiversity – should rather be considered as having an intrinsic 
value, that is a value per se and not for some other means. The Convention 
on Biological diversity, for instance, is based on such a view. in the Preamble 
it is stated that the contracting parties are “conscious of the intrinsic value of 
biological diversity […] and its components”. Matteo andreozzi’s essay is 
devoted to the discussion of the possible intrinsic value of biodiversity. andre-
ozzi, against those environmental ethicists who deny biodiversity any intrinsic 
value, analyzes the distinct meanings that the concept of intrinsic value can have, 
concluding that biodiversity can be seen as having an intrinsic value according 
to one of these possible understandings, and that “ascribing intrinsic value to 
biodiversity allows a true reconciliation between anthropocentric interests and 
the need to extend the moral community beyond humanity”23.
References
aubertin, C., Boisvert, V. et Vivien, f.-d.
– 1998, La construction sociale de la question de la biodiversité, nSS, 6(1): 7-19
Blondel, J.
– 1995, Biogéographie, Paris, Masson
CBd (Convention on Biological diversity)
– 1992, Convention on biological diversity, text available at uRL = http://www.cbd.int/
convention/text/
22 Rolston 1985.
23 i thank anouk Barberousse, Jorge Marques da Silva and alessandro Minelli for their useful 
comments to a previous version of this text. 
12
Chen, J. et al.
– 2011, How DNA barcodes complement taxonomy and explore species diversity: The case 
study of a poorly understood marine fauna, “PLoS one”, 2011, 6(6): e21326
Costanza, R. et al.
– 1997, The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital, “Science”, 387: 
253-260
darwin, C.
– 1958, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809-1882. With the Original Omissions 
Restored. Edited and With Appendix and Notes By His Granddaughter Nora Barlow, 
London, Collins
deLong, d.C. 
– 1996, Defining biodiversity, “Wildlife Society Bulletin”, 24: 738-49
Gaston, K.J. and Spicer, J.i. 
– 1998, Biodiversity. An Introduction, oxford, Blackwell
hey, J.
– 2001, Genes, Categories and Species: the Evolutionary and Cognitive Causes of the Spe-
cies Problem, oxford, oxford university Press
hurlbert, S.h. 
– 1971, The nonconcept of species diversity: A critique and alternative parameters, “Ecol-
ogy”, 52: 577-586
Johnson, G.d. et al.
– 2009, Deep-sea mystery solved: astonishing larval transformations and etreme sexual 
dimorphism unite three fish families, “Biology Letters”, 5: 235-239
Lévêque, C. 
– 2010, Sous le nom de “biodiversité”, “Sciences au Sud. Le journal de l’iRd”, 54, 
avril-mai: 16
Lévêque, C. and Mounolou, J.-C.
– 2003, Biodiversity, Chichester (uK), John Wiley
Maffie, J. 
– 1998, Atran’s evolutionary psychology: “Say it ain’t just-so, Joe”, “Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences”, 21: 583-4
noss, R. 
– 1990, Indicators for monitoring biodiversity: A hierarchial approach, “Conservation 
Biology”, 4(4): 355-64
oksanen, M. 
– 2004, Biodiversity considered philosophically. An introduction, in M. oksanen and 
J. Pie tarinen (eds.), Philosophy and Biodiversity, Cambridge, Cambridge university 
Press: 1-23
Richards, R. 
– 2010, The Species Problem, Cambridge, Cambridge university Press
13
Rolston, h.
– 1985, Duties to endangered species, “BioScience”, 35(11): 718-26
Santana, C.
– 2014, Save the planet: Eliminate biodiversity, “Biol. Philos.”, 29: 761-80
Takacs, d. 
– 1996, The Idea of Biodiversity. Philosophies of Life, Baltimore (Md), John hopkins 
university Press
Wilson, E.o. 
– 1992, The Diversity of Life, Cambridge (Mass), Belknap Press of harvard
